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In the European Union, the implementation deficit arises when Union legislation is implemented at
varying degrees or not at all. This problem is a common occurrence in the field of EU environmental policy.
Although results of the directive are binding, some Member States do not comply with their obligation. In
this article, the cases of the national implementation of the Restriction of Hazardous Substances Directive
(RoHS) in the Member States Germany and United Kingdom are examined. It sets out to describe the
influence of national regulatory styles and structures in the two countries on EU law implementation.
Through the lens of historical institutionalism, this paper asks the question: “why are some member states
able to implement EU directives more easily than others?”. The article argues that since it is more similar
to the EU regulatory styles and structures, the German government can implement environmental policy
more easily than the UK government. Consequently, an implementation gap occurs, not through the
Member States’ unwillingness to comply, but due to limited capabilities to implement.
I. Introduction
Throughout the European Union (EU), there
exists the problem of an implementation gap
or deficit. National implementing measures
are texts which are “officially adopted by the
authorities in a Member State to incorporate
the provisions in a directive into national law”
(European Commission, 2011). Article 288 of
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European
Union states that a directive shall be binding,
as to the result to be achieved, upon each Mem-
ber State to which it is addressed, but shall
leave to the national authorities the choice of
form and methods. The implementation deficit
is the issue of policies being implemented at
varying degrees, late, or, in some cases, not
at all. This occurs in spite of the fact that di-
rectives are binding and that there are certain
procedures in place to bring Member States
(MS) to justice if they do not comply with their
obligations to implement.
This paper aims to explain why some coun-
tries are able to implement directives in time
and some are not. To illustrate this point, envi-
ronmental policy of the EU, a field in which im-
plementation gaps are predominant, and one
particular directive is focussed on. In Febru-
ary 2003, the EU adopted 2002/95/EC: the
restriction of certain hazardous substances in
electrical and electronic equipment, or, the Re-
striction of Hazardous Substances Directive
(RoHS). The objectives are legal harmonisa-
tion and protection of human health, both con-
sumer and manufacturer, and the environment
by applying restrictions to components of elec-
trical goods in a world of ‘throw away’ technol-
ogy. The implementation of the RoHS directive
will be looked at in MS Germany and the UK.
Environmental policy making and governance
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from the 1980’s, up to the initial creation of
the RoHS directive in 2003 in Germany, the
UK and EU provides the basic structure of the
paper. Through doing this, the paper seeks to
answer the research question: why are some
MS able to implement EU directives more eas-
ily than others? The claim being that some
countries have a similar governmental and pol-
icy structure to that of the EU and thus are able
to implement directives more easily than those
MS which have less similar policy structures.
A historical approach is crucial in explaining a
number of questions: how did the different pol-
icy and government approaches come to exist
today in Germany, the UK and the EU? Why
are they different in Germany and the UK?
Is this a factor of the implementation deficit?
Arguably, some countries are simply better pre-
pared than others structurally to implement a
directive quickly: hence, the problem of the
existence of an implementation gap or deficit.
Mbaye (2001) found that structural reasons,
such as poverty or inefficient bureaucracies,
can mean that problems arise during imple-
mentation. Using the multi-level governance
theory, she also points out that the more ac-
tors with different interests involved, the more
problems arise (Mbaye, 2001, p.264). Masten-
broek (2003) examines the complexity of direc-
tives. Multiple new measures which need to
be introduced complicate transposition (p.377).
She emphasizes the ‘goodness of fit’ theory, or,
the “degree of compatibility between EU and
national policies and institutions” (p.378). This
is related to Knill and Lenschow’s (2003, 2011)
argument that if states have to dramatically
change structures to gain the capacity to imple-
ment, their implementation performance will
be worse than those MS which are a better ‘fit’
to the requirements of an EU directive. Using
a historical reasoning, the inference is that MS
have pre-determined capabilities due to his-
torical context and actions – accordingly they
cannot implement at the same time as each
other, particularly if the EU policy approach is
more ‘tuned’ to some states than others.
First, the methodology and theory will be
explained. Part 2 is an explanation of the two
countries’ styles of governance and policy mak-
ing, describing and comparing the regulatory
styles and structures of Germany and the UK.
Then the paper will examine the progression of
environmental policy and the implementation
of the RoHS directive in Germany, the same
will be looked at in the following section but
with a focus on the UK’s history and approach.
Afterwards, the two countries and how they are
related to the style and structure of EU environ-
mental policy are discussed. This is in order
to illustrate the differences in Germany and
the UK’s structures and subsequent abilities
to implement environmental directives. The
final section will give the overall concluding
remarks and findings of the study.
I. Methodology
After the RoHS directive was created, Germany
was able to implement faster than the UK.
These two countries are large and influential
MS. Particularly in regards to environmental
policy, a non-implemented directive in a large
MS is more disastrous and dangerous; environ-
mental policy is not successful unless all states
comply. Accordingly, the conclusions of this
paper are meaningful and significant for the en-
tire EU. In the respective sections, the history of
the development and shaping of policy trends
and approaches in Germany, the UK and the
EU are analysed. Afterwards, how the RoHS
directive was implemented indicates why it
was implemented at various speeds; this is a
reflection of their past policies and degree of
harmonisation with the EU. The country analy-
ses serve as evidence of the differing structures
explained in part 2. This paper mostly refers
to the practical implementation of the RoHS
directive as opposed to only examining the le-
gal implementation in order to assess the full
transposition.
The primary and secondary sources which
are used throughout the study have been re-
trieved through Internet and archival research.
Secondary literature, both German and British,
builds the paper’s argument, making the con-
clusions more meaningful due to the existing
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academic literature on and evidence of the EU’s
implementation deficit. EU Commission White
papers, directives and reports, particularly re-
ports on the progress of the directive and those
from the DG Environment, have been studied
to better understand how the directive was
formed and how environmental policy devel-
ops; this indicates the type of approach the
EU has to this policy field. Historical stud-
ies, newspapers, statistics and other indicators
to how environmental policy has evolved in
Germany, the UK and the EU are vital to this
study.
The paper’s research question requires an
historical-institutional approach as patterns of
‘behaviour’ of the British and German govern-
ments, and of course the EU’s, will prove if es-
tablished norms and practices determine how
a MS performs when implementing an EU di-
rective. Historical institutionalism (HI), as one
of the forms of new institutionalism, is based
on a certain definition of institutions. Differ-
ent from the organizations commonly known
under the term, such as the EU institutions,
Hall (1996) defines institutions as “formal or
informal procedures, routines and norms and
conventions embedded in the organizational
structure of the polity or political economy” (p.
938). Examples of such institutions could be
a nation’s constitution, a set of laws or a pol-
icy approach. Historical institutionalists base
their research on a few particular assumptions.
Firstly, there is an ongoing conflict in politics
for scarce resources. States themselves are not
single, neutral entities but consist of several in-
stitutions able to influence this struggle (Hall,
1996, p. 937 f.). Secondly, institutions in gen-
eral favour some parties over others (Hall, 1996,
p.941 and Immergut, 1998, p. 8). Thirdly, insti-
tutions create ‘paths’ which public policy can
follow; they create the context in which politi-
cal decisions are taken (Immergut, 1998, p. 22).
This concept described as ‘path dependence’
is built upon the idea that past institutions in-
fluence future developments; restated: “what
happened at an earlier point of time will affect
the possible outcomes of a sequence of events
occurring at a later point in time” (Sewell, 1996,
p. 262-3).
On the one hand, past developments (pre-
viously taken paths) can entail that the gov-
ernment will continue in the same way. As ar-
gued by Pierson (2000), governments are highly
likely to follow the already taken path due to
the logics of increasing returns. Since the costs
of changing the path to an alternative are very
high (political as well as economic costs), ac-
tors are highly likely to stay on the path they
are following. Therefore, the longer the actor
stays on the path, the less likely he is to change
(p.252). However, on the other hand, previous
policies can have the exact opposite effect. See-
ing the non-effectiveness of the past approach,
governmental actors might change their be-
haviour and leave or change the path. Thus,
the fourth assumption is that critical junctures
exist: changes of behaviour, sometimes also
initiated by historical events or changes in in-
stitutions, divide the path that had previously
been followed. They create new paths which
can then be followed by the government. Fur-
thermore, harmonisation through common EU
legislation changes the institutional context in
which the national governments act. Through
aligning the legislation in environmental poli-
cies, national actors have fewer possibilities to
follow their past approach independently. HI
is therefore useful in analysing the causes of
the implementation deficit in order to see if
capabilities and structures which have evolved
and exist in Germany, the UK and the EU mean
that some MS are more able to implement di-
rectives in time or faster than other MS. HI is
applied to the events leading up to and of the
RoHS directive to test if the concept of path
dependence holds true for the development
of the respective environmental policies and
subsequent ability to implement.
II. Germany and the UK’s policy
approaches and governance
In order to understand why Germany and the
UK implemented the RoHS directive at differ-
ent times and also adding to the discussion of a
MS implementation gap in general, these coun-
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tries’ respective regulatory approaches and
governance in environmental policy must be
examined. The UK has typically created policy
using the regulatory approach of cost-benefit
analysis (CBA). CBA is rooted in the concept
of economic efficiency in the respects of the
requirement that any goal must exceed costs
for any course of action, and that, where possi-
ble, goals should themselves be determined by
reference to a maximum excess of benefits over
costs (Pearce, 1998). This approach is more
economically orientated than Germany’s ap-
proach. Despite the fact that CBA is widely
practiced by many countries, it still remains a
controversial tool. In current times, it must be
noted that the UK government predominantly
uses CBA in environmental policies and much
less so in other policy fields. The controversy
of this approach in the environmental field lies
in the cost orientated policies which emphasise
the quality of the environment as opposed to
the quantity of pollutants. It is the view that
the environment can absorb a certain degree
of damage without any harmful side effects
arising (Knill & Liefferink, 2007).
Germany’s environmental policies also take
into account a form of CBA, Wirtschaftliche
Vertretbarkeit (economic viability), which is the
proportionality of cost and gain. However,
in contrast to the UK, how the environment
should primarily be governed is a technology-
orientated consideration. “Regardless of local
conditions which might vary (e.g. the state of
the environment or the economic situation of
an industrial firm) the ‘best available technol-
ogy’ (BAT) should be used uniformly in order
to reduce the emission of pollutants” (Knill &
Liefferink, 2007, p.36). This is very much in
line with the environmental policy principles
of precautionary and prevention. Both stipu-
late that action should be taken before damage
to the environment arises (ibid). The damages
to the world should be avoided in advance;
dangers to health and environment should be
detected early by comprehensive research. It
also means to develop, in all sectors of the econ-
omy, technological processes that significantly
reduce environmental burdens (O’Riordan &
Cameron, 1994).
Further disparities between the UK and
Germany’s approach to environmental policy
can be found in their regulatory styles and
structures. Regulatory style is defined as pat-
terns between administrative and societal ac-
tors, the mode of state intervention and level
of administrative interest (Knill & Lenschow,
(2011). The two types of style are intervention-
ist and mediating regulatory styles: command-
and-control and limited flexibility versus self-
regulation and discretion (ibid). The definition
of command-and-control which will be used
hereafter is the direct regulation of an indus-
try or activity by legislation that states what is
permitted and what is illegal (McManus, 2009).
The ‘command’ is the standards by a govern-
ment authority that must be complied with;
‘control’ signifies negative sanctions that may
result from non-compliance (Baldwin, Cave &
Lodge, 2011). Regulatory structure is focussing
on whether governance is centralised or decen-
tralised and assessing the level of administra-
tion coordination and control. The UK govern-
ment’s regulatory style is characterised as a me-
diator. Typically, flexible environmental policy
instruments are favoured which allow greater
discretion and take into consideration particu-
lar circumstances such as local environmental
quality, available technology and the economic
situation of the regulated polluter (ibid). Pol-
icy shapers in the UK tend to form informal
relationships with public actors which can in-
fluence bargaining and the negotiations are
then relatively separate to the government. On
the other hand, the German regulatory style
is of the interventionist type. Germany is the
European leader in terms of command-and-
control environmental regulation and insists
on uniform substantive standards (ibid). Ne-
gotiations between authorities and industry in
Germany take place “under the shadow of the
law” (p.597). This means that these types of
negotiations take place under the watch of the
government and access for third parties is quite
limited (Winter, 1996).
In terms of regulatory structure, both could
equally be characterised as decentralised and
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fragmented. However, the UK is decentralised
in the sense of sectors of government, as in
the case of the Department of the Environ-
ment (DOE) which has devolved implemen-
tation competencies to a whole range of dif-
ferent inspectorates and authorities at the cen-
tral and local level. There is no hierarchical
control of local day-to-day activities by central
government, implying high variation of local
authority performance throughout the coun-
try (Steel 1979: 34; Weale 1996). In Germany,
however, the decentralisation is rooted in the
federal structure. There is a division of com-
petences between the federal (policy formula-
tion) and regional level (implementation and
practical application), although these are obvi-
ously interlocking under the umbrella of the
federal government. The difference in regula-
tory styles and structures is illustrated more
simply in Figure 1. It is important to say that
these different approaches in Germany and the
UK have resulted in about the same amount of
pollution reduction, although the political costs
have been significantly lower in the UK than
in Germany (Kollman & Prakash, 2001). This
paper sets to examine if the UK or Germany’s
approaches are more similar to that of the EU’s
and if this is the cause of the implementation
gap.
Figure 1: A comparison of the German and British ad-
ministration patterns (regulatory style and
structure) in environmental policy (Knill &
Lenschow, 2011, p.598)
I. Germany and the RoHS
To understand why Germany implemented the
RoHS directive faster than the UK, the regu-
latory style and structure and its history as a
‘green’ MS shall be examined. To implement
this directive into national law, the German
government created the ‘ElektroG’ law, which
entered into force in August 2005. This act
combined the RoHS and the Waste Electrical
and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) directives.
The aim of the WEEE directive was to de-
crease the rising amount of electronic goods
waste through increasing the producer’s re-
sponsibilities. ElektroG addresses two different
groups: the consumer and the producer of elec-
tronic equipment. Consumers are informed,
by the local authorities, of their obligation to
bring electronic waste to the collection point
provided by these authorities. Producers face
a more complex set of tasks. Firstly, the prod-
ucts must be labelled with a logo which makes
it easier for consumers to recognize products
which have to be recycled. Furthermore, ev-
ery producer has to register with the authority
responsible before introducing new products
onto the market. Under the guidelines pro-
vided, producers must ensure that their prod-
ucts are easy to recycle and do not contain any
of the hazardous substances stipulated in Arti-
cle 4 of the ElektroG act. Furthermore, Article
6 of the ElektroG states that all producers must
provide a guarantee that they will reimburse
all the costs occurred from handling their prod-
ucts when brought back to be recycled. Prod-
ucts must have the producer’s permanent logo
on them, in case infringement of the ElektroG
standards is detected. That way, the infringing
company can be found more easily.
Although the RoHS directive was intended
to be implemented by the MS by August 2004,
Germany implemented the directive one year
later. As the RoHS directive is highly com-
plex and detailed, this delay is somewhat un-
derstandable. As Knill and Lenschow (1998)
state, one reason why some MS have difficul-
ties implementing directives is that their ad-
ministrative structure does not have the capac-
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ity to fulfil the requirements of EU policies
quickly enough. If administrative structures
are not fully established and then have to be
altered dramatically to adhere to the EU direc-
tives, it can delay the implementation process.
Likewise, the implementation process moves
quickly if only comparatively minor organiza-
tional changes are required for already existing
structures. Germany was able to transpose the
directive relatively fast. This is because the
governance and administration system already
has the necessary structures and capacity for
directives such as the RoHS. Due to Germany’s
formal decentralization (Knill et al., 1998), the
ElektroG law was decided upon at the national
level but the implementation, or practicalities,
was carried out at the regional and local level.
Moreover, Article 9 of the ElektroG law stip-
ulates that local waste disposal organizations
have to organize how the waste is collected.
This made the overall implementation easier as
the practical arrangements could be delegated
to the local authorities; the existing authorities
were given new tasks but no new authorities
had to be created. Germany’s interventionist
approach supports a ‘command and control’
type of regulatory rules. This is reflected in
the ElektroG law as there are strict measures
which have to be followed by the companies
producing electronic products. They have no
discretion in fulfilling the requirements as they
are not allowed to bring their products onto
the European market if they do not comply
with the standards. This creates high pressure
on producers which are affected by the RoHS.
However, as companies have to abide by the
law and there is no mediation or negotiation
between the government and each industry, the
implementation process is quite fast.
A further derivative of the German ap-
proach can be found in the historical devel-
opment of environmental policies. Typically,
Germany is considered a highly industrial and
hugely populated country; this entailed serious
problems of air and water pollution. Especially
in the 1980’s and the 1990’s, the environment
and its policies gained attention. Events like
the Waldsterben (deforestation) in the 1980’s
created a climate of concern for the protection
of environment in Germany. Acid rain, which
was suspected to have caused the deforesta-
tion, fuelled actions against air pollution. The
Party “Die Grünen”, Germany’s green party,
also gained support. Even though Germany’s
reunification in 1990 distracted the policy focus
away from the environment to a certain extent,
the 1986 nuclear accident in Tschernobyl and
the debate on climate change had provided a
base for further action in environmental mat-
ters (Jänicke, 2009). Moreover, water pollution,
in rivers such as the Rhein or Elbe, and in-
creasing air pollution made stricter and faster
measures necessary. However, German envi-
ronmental policy has not been successful in
protecting natural diversity (Markham, 2008)
which could reduce its ‘green’ image.
The policy path which Germany has his-
torically taken, and still continues along today,
makes an abandoning of this approach unlikely.
Historical events and choices which the gov-
ernment at the time made, have determined
Germany’s modern interventionist approach.
Environmental organisations gained influence
in the past decades and now hold a strong po-
sition in policy creation. It would be difficult
for the government to adopt a more mediating
style as German policy is focused on uniform,
state governed policies throughout the country.
This is all more easily obtained by a command-
and-control approach. Due to the German ad-
ministrative system, the government had an
automatic capacity and means by which to im-
plement the RoHS directive and incorporate it
into existing structures and therefore national
law.
II. The UK and the RoHS
In the UK, the RoHS directive was imple-
mented through The Restriction of the Use of
Certain Hazardous Substances in Electrical and
Electronic Equipment Regulation 2006 and is
closely related to the WEEE Directive. The law
was introduced by the Parliament in October
2005, intended to apply to the whole of the
UK. It came into force on the 1st July, 2006.
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The implementation process of the Regulation
was supervised and enforced by an executive
agency of the Department of Trade and Indus-
try (DTI), the National Weight and Measure-
ment Laboratory (NWML) (Willson, Williams
& Kemp, 2010, p. 338). The British government
supported efforts to facilitate the practical im-
plementation for stakeholders and national en-
forcement bodies. Nevertheless, several trans-
posing problems within the UK remained. In
this section of the paper, the UK’s general po-
sition in regards to the implementation of EU
environmental policies is investigated to ex-
plain the implementation delay in the UK.
The directive is clear in its targets, namely
the harmonization and protection of human
health. However, within the industry sector,
preventative assumptions and definitions are
expressed to a lesser extent (Martin, Mayers
and France, 2007, p.213). Therefore, the ex-
act meaning is left to interpretation, the di-
rective does not straightforwardly say how
MS must monitor and enforce it to achieve
compliance. In the UK, further agencies were
announced to supervise the compliance with
RoHS which left them great discretion (Will-
son, Williams & Kemp, 2010, p.337). The group
of assessment bodies self-regulates and deals
with complaints and issues in cooperation with
the NWML to bolster RoHS compliance (ibid,
p.141). However, through the emphasis on
‘self-declaration’ in the system, problems arise.
Without being asked to provide documenta-
tion over compliance to the authorities, pro-
ducers are not obliged to do so. Only when
the relevant technical information documents
are demanded, the companies have to provide
them within 28 days (Commission Final Re-
port, 2008, p.131). When the documentation
is not presented, fines rising up to £5000 can
be enforced and even an unlimited fine can be
demanded (p.142). Nevertheless, both pressure
by British authorities and documentation are
lacking for the RoHS implementation (Willson,
Williams & Kemp, 2010, p. 326 & 338).
The mediating style used by the British gov-
ernment means that no exact method to mon-
itor producer compliance is used. The decen-
tralized structures entail the risk of exploitation
by producers. Typical for British environmen-
tal policy, the idea of self-regulation is linked
to the CBA. The RoHS brought costs for both
the producers and the government which had
to set up teams to conduct market surveillance
in order to detect non-compliant producers.
The task of practical transposition was given to
agencies, which means that the administrative
burden for the government and the expendi-
tures are kept to a minimum. The problem
of a complete and all-encompassing adoption
of directives is not a new or isolated case in
the history of the UK’s environmental policies.
The UK government conducts as a mediator;
thereby the emphasis is on self-regulation by
producers. The UK’s means of governance is
not to be confused with a badly exercised pol-
icy style, it is merely a product of determining
factors from the past.
Britain was the first industrialized country
in the world. The initial focus of the industri-
alization was on the benefits to the economy
rather than the possible negative environmen-
tal effects. This choice of action has filtered
down to its performance today, in relation to
path dependency theory. Despite the economic
focus, a serious problem of pollution emerged
in the modernizing Britain. This problem was
tackled by a case-by-case approach due to vary-
ing degrees of pollution and the fact that it was
harder at that time to measure pollution. In
the past, environmental actions in the UK have
also proven to be “pragmatic rather than radi-
cal; tactical rather than strategic; reactive rather
than proactive” (Lowe & Flinn, 1984, p.254). En-
vironmental policies were handled by “a whole
range of different inspectorates and at the cen-
tral and local level” (Knill & Lifferink, 2011,
p.597). These structures resulted in personal
negotiations between local authorities and pro-
ducers and had a great influence on flexibility
(ibid, p.598). No centralised supervisory body
that ensured homogeneous implementation
was created; the department placed in charge
for enforcement takes full responsibility. Today,
measures undertaken to ensure implementa-
tion and compliance are independent from hi-
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erarchical structures and the enforcement body
acts autonomously (ibid, p.598). Further dif-
ferences can be found surrounding the precau-
tionary principle (’acting in advance’). It is one
of the main principles in environmental policy
that carries some controversy in UK environ-
mental policy. As previously stated, the British
government has the stance that the environ-
ment can take certain levels of pollution before
it becomes harmful. It is also dependent on
individual circumstances, taking into account
“the cost of the preventative technology and the
economic situation of the company” (Knill &
Liefferink 2007). The UK’s path dependency of
its history in environmental policy making has
determined the decentralised, individual case
approach of today. Although in recent times
the UK’s focus on environmental protection
has raised remarkably, the actual improvement
and the challenge to untie from a merely cost
orientated approach seems to be difficult. The
implementation of the RoHS directive demon-
strates the UK’s path dependency, since past
structures still determine recent behaviour.
III. EU policy making trends and ap-
proaches in relation to Germany and
the UK
To compare the EU environmental policy ap-
proach with the German and UK approach, this
part of the paper analyses the history of EU en-
vironmental policy. The continuous change of
the policy approach, regulatory style and struc-
ture of EU environmental policy illustrates how
CBA and BAT contributed to the formation
of the EU’s current policy approach. Com-
parisons can be drawn between the EU and
Germany and the UK respectively. European
environmental policy has its beginning in the
early 1970s, with the first Environmental Ac-
tion Plan (EAP) in 1973 (Hey, 2005, p. 18). It
was mainly concerned with basic environmen-
tal issues, like the prevention and reduction of
environmental damage, or the rational use of
natural resources. Furthermore, the first EAP
was concerned with the idea of sustainable
development and saw the need for comprehen-
sive actions within other policy fields, which
suggests a first sign of a future interventionist
approach. During the second EAP (1977-1981),
the Union further developed these goals (ibid.).
The first real ‘wave of change’ came about
in the early-1980s when the third EAP (1982-
1986) orientated the targets of environmental
policies towards the internal market. It pro-
posed a more emission-centred approach, away
from the quality-oriented ideas of earlier years
(Hey, 2005, p. 19). This shift towards the inter-
nal market can be seen as a first step towards
the UK’s decentralised and quality-oriented
approach, which should become stronger in
later times. The Single European Act from
1986 can be seen as a major turning point for
the Union’s environmental policy. First, envi-
ronmental policy, for the first time, was given
a treaty-status and environmental protection
received its own chapter in the Treaty (Hey,
2005, p. 20). Second, the Commission tried to
extend its influence and urged for uniform sub-
stantive standards on Union level, mirroring
the German command-and-control approach
(ibid., p.21). The fourth EAP (1987-1992) there-
fore proposed a more integrated and ‘sectoral
approach’, ‘analysing the impact of strategic
economic sectors on the environment’ (Hey,
2005, p. 21). The Union tried to introduce
new instruments in the policy field, such as
taxes, subsidies or tradable emission permits.
This would change the current situation into a
hierarchical structure with less flexibility and
more power to the institutions. In the begin-
ning of the 1990s, the Commission published a
white paper on “Growth, Competitiveness and
Employment” in which they proposed a new
development model that would benefit both
the economy as well as the environment (CEC
1993). Hey therefore talks about a paradigm
shift during that time from “trade orientation”
to a “sustainability frame” (2005, p. 21). The
fifth EAP should have been another step in
that direction. It proposed to move the pol-
icy approach beyond environmental protection
and favoured the German idea of BAT by fo-
cusing on sustainable development without
harm to environmental and natural resources
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(McCormick, 2001, p. 63). However, the Com-
mission’s initiative did not find much support
among the MS. Therefore they promoted a new
agenda in the policy field and urged for more
decentralisation, rather concerned about the
competitiveness of their industries than setting
uniform environmental standards (Hey, 2005,
p. 23). In their view, the German approach,
favoured by the Commission, did not take into
account the problem of multiple speeds be-
tween the MS (McCormick, 2001, p. 66). Fur-
thermore, it led to economic inefficiency on the
national and local level. Thus, the MS encour-
aged a more flexible, cost-effective and mar-
ket oriented solution to environmental prob-
lems (ibid.), according to the UK model. They
wanted a renationalisation of environmental
policies in line with the subsidiarity principle
(Hey, 2005, pp. 23-24).
One reason for the UK’s approach gain-
ing such marked support during that time is
the German shift of focus, away from environ-
mental policies. Due to the re-unification of
the German state, the country directed its fo-
cus to essential national economic problems.
“The discussion on the modernisation of envi-
ronmental policies there came to a standstill”
(Hey, 2005, p. 24) and this gave the UK ap-
proach the chance to become stronger, gaining
more popularity among the MS. The Commis-
sion realised the unwillingness of the MS to
follow the paradigmatic change (ibid.). There-
fore, the fourth, and last, change can be seen
as a compromise between the Commission and
the MS or the German interventionist approach
and the UK approach of decentralisation and
flexibility. “The Commission shifted from its
previous top-down approach and instrumental
focus of environmental policy integration to-
wards a broader and less committed approach”
(Hey, 2005, p. 26). Even though most of the
national environmental policies have become
mainly EU driven, the process of policy prepa-
ration became much more participatory as it
now includes environmental NGOs, expert net-
works, numerous consultation processes and
national bureaucrats (ibid.). Furthermore, since
the sixth EAP (2002-2012) there is a wider use
of standardization for environmental policies
and a more cooperative approach with the in-
dustry, such as integrated product policies. The
Commission changed its key role from the ini-
tiator to rather the manager of environmental
policy (ibid., p. 27). A compromise and overlap
of the two different approaches emerged: The
EU sets out the substantive standards or the
general framework of general principles and
objectives and identifies themes and principles
(ibid.), which is similar to the German model.
More decisions and tasks are delegated to the
MS as well as their freedom to choose how to
achieve necessary goals for reduction (ibid., p.
25), which is similar to the UK model.
IV. Discussion
Having discussed the different policy styles
and structures and their historical development
in EU environmental policy, Germany and the
UK, the paper now turns to combining the find-
ings. UK environmental policy encompasses a
voluntary approach for companies, and public
actors have strong influence on policy making.
German governance encapsulates uniform poli-
cies, strong state intervention and controlled
access of third parties in policy negotiations.
As the EU is a supranational entity, EU policy
falls into the category which involves greater
state intervention and limited involvement of
private actors in order for directives to be uni-
form throughout the EU. The EU emphasises a
more centralised approach in order for direc-
tives to be as similar as possible throughout
the Union. During the time of the policy pro-
cess of the RoHS directive (late 1990s – early
2000s) it has moved away from the ‘command-
and-control’ approach of earlier times towards
a more integrated and holistic approach (Hey,
2005, p. 18). In that sense, the EU’s approach is
comparable to the German approach. The bu-
reaucratic structure in particular is very similar
to that of Germany; it is divided into different
stages and involves several actors. On the one
hand, the division between policy formulation
on the European level and implementation on
the national level is comparable (McCormick,
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2001, p. 65). On the other hand, several ac-
tors are involved in the formulation process
already: different DGs have to coordinate with
each other; Commission committees and na-
tional bureaucrats as well as industry and en-
vironmental NGOs have an interest in the for-
mulation (ibid.). Additionally, as shown in the
fifth EAP, there has been a trend toward sus-
tainable development, the idea of the BAT and
precautionary measures.
Even though the EU has a tendency to lean
towards the German approach, there are still
some influences from the UKs regulatory struc-
ture, which are especially favoured by the MS.
They urge for flexible and rather independent
policy instruments that allow them greater dis-
cretion and more freedoms in regards to na-
tional environmental problems (Hey, 2005, p.
25). Therefore, due to the subsidiarity prin-
ciple, more and more tasks and decisions are
delegated to the national level and leave it to
the MS as to how to achieve certain goals (ibid.).
Nevertheless, the German regulatory style of
an interventionist is more consistent with the
EU’s structures whereas the British structure
shows greater difficulties to adjust to the EU’s
policy style. It is because of this that the Ger-
man government found it easier to implement
the RoHS directive than the UK did.
III. Conclusion
Although Germany and the UK’s differences
are not as apparent or broad-ranging as they
once were, the contrasting regulatory styles
and structures of Germany and the UK were
focussed on: the interventionist and the me-
diator, the BAT versus the CBA. The latter of
the two aspects of environmental governance
has been reasoned by these countries’ histories.
This approach was applied to the study to ex-
plain why Germany and the UK implemented
the RoHS directive at different times and with
the broader significance of why implementa-
tion gaps exist.
The UK’s current governmental approach
is rooted in its history as the first industrialised
country. CBA in the UK is derived from a time
where Britain was a leader in industrialisation
and benefits to the economy were high on the
agenda. Conservative groups also influenced
early environmental actions; today’s actions
tend to be more decentralised. Policies are
also made more on a case-by-case basis than in
Germany where uniform policies are the rule.
Historically, Germany industrialised later but
also suffered from negative environmental con-
sequences of heavy industry. When faced with
the negative, polluting effects of such industry,
mass environmental movements occurred on
a larger scale than in many other European
countries. Subsequently, the public voice was
ignited, and it demanded strict environmen-
tal policies. This has created a strong political
will; politicians in Germany must adhere to
demand. Therefore, current German environ-
mental policies are strict and focussed on the
latest technology, relatively regardless of the
cost, using the BAT to ensure uniform high
standards.
Germany’s regulatory style is the interven-
tionist which requires uniform policies and
rules throughout the country, operating more
along the lines of command-and-control. Ac-
cess for third parties is quite limited in nego-
tiations of environmental policies. Conversely,
Britain’s policies are exercised by using much
more flexible policy instruments, which allow
for variations in policy to occur due to indi-
vidual circumstances. Negotiations are also
much more inclusive of private actors than in
Germany. Both regulatory structures are de-
centralised in certain ways, but, Germany has
interlocking competences between the federal
and regional level whereas the UK uses agen-
cies and certain departments to organise the
practicalities of policies. We find that despite
an implementation delay in both countries, Ger-
many arguably implemented more successfully.
This stems from the EU’s environmental policy
approach being more similar to the German ap-
proach than to the British one. These findings
help understand why implementation works
better in some MS than in others.
The limitations of the paper can be used for
future research on this topic. Only one theory,
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two MS and one directive have been examined.
Researching the implementation of other direc-
tives in the environmental field would build
the argument which has been put forth as to
why the implementation deficit exists. Look-
ing at different MS and their administrative
structures, and therefore potential capacity to
transpose directives into their national systems,
would further prove that there is a relation
between non-implementation and existing na-
tional structures.
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